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ABSTRACT 
Spanish Treasury bond auctions have two distinctive features. First, the format used is a 
hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Second, there is uncertainty 
about the amount to be issued, since the announced target volume is not compulsory and it 
is established jointly for two different bonds that are auctioned separately. 
This paper explores Spanish Treasury bond auctions both from a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective. In the theoretical analysis we present a model to explore the revenue efficiency 
of Spanish Treasury bond auctions. Given the complexity of the Spanish auction game, the 
model abstracts from many features of the market, but it captures the two distinctive features 
of the Spanish auction: the format used and the uncertainty about the amount to be issued. 
The main result is that there exists for the Spanish auction format a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium that maximizes the seller's revenue, which is unique in the sense that each of the 
equilibria gives the same utility to all players. This result suggests that both the 
discriminatory and the Spanish auction format behave in a similar way in the model 
proposed. 
The empirical analysis uses data of Spanish bond auctions between 1993 and 1997 to test the 
predictions of the model and to establish the main characteristics of Spanish bond auctions. 
The main results are as follows. First, as predicted by the model, auction discounts are small 
in size and not statistically significant for auctions with volume announcements where the 
bond auctioned is identical to an existing one traded on the secondary market, which we think 
that the model better characterizes. Second, both participation and competition are significant 
determinants of the size of auction discounts: participation has a positive effect, since as the 
number of bidders increases the winner's curse is more severe, and they bid less 
aggressively. Competition, measured by the cover ratio (volume bid over volume accepted), 
has a negative effect, as competition reduces the probability of winning and induces bidders 
to bid more aggressively. Third, variables measuring price and quantity uncertainty faced by 
bidders also have a positive effect on the size of auction discounts. Although the analysis 
presented here does not allow for the separation of the effect of price uncertainty from the 
effect of quantity uncertainty, there is some indication that both sorts of uncertainty matter. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Auctions are among the oldest mechanism of price discovery, and nowadays are a common 
form of organizing trade. They are used to allocate art objects, fish, oil drilling rights, as 
well as financial securities. 
One of the most important auction markets in the world is the market for government debt. 
Treasuries apply mainly two auction formats: discriminatory and uniform price auctions. 
The majority of the Treasuries around the world use discriminatory auctions. In a 
discriminatory auction, winning bidders pay their bid price. A few Treasuries use uniform 
price auctions, where all winning bidders pay the same price for each unit, the minimum 
accepted price. But the Spanish Treasury is the only one that uses a hybrid system of 
discriminatory and uniform price auctions: winning bidders pay their bid price if it is lower 
than the weighted average price of winning bids, while all other winning bidders pay the 
weighted average of winning bids. With the Spanish format, the price that a bidder has to 
pay depends on the bids of all other winning bidders, including his own bids. This fact 
increases the players' strategic considerations with respect to discriminatory and uniform 
auctions, even in the more simple models. 
A principal aim of auction theory is to identify the auction mechanism that maximizes the 
expected revenue of the seller. In environments that consider the auction of a single, 
indivisible good, theoretical models are able to order different auction formats according to 
expected revenue for the seller. Settings with multiple identical items, where each bidder 
demand only one unit yield similar results. However, in government debt auctions bidders 
usually make multiple bids, where a bid is a price-quantity pair. In environments with 
multiple units and bidders that may buy more than one unit, general results even for the most 
common auction forms, discriminatory and uniform auctions, remain elusive. The reason is 
that the game becomes very complicated, since with multiple units, bidders have a very 
large strategy space. Theoretical studies use a lot of simplifying assumptions. given the 
complexity of the game, and results are ambiguous. Empirical analyses present also mixed 
results. For example, the U.S. Treasury traditionally used discriminatory auctions, but now 
is using also the uniform format for certain issues. 
Compared to the overwhelming amount of work about uniform and discriminatory auctions, 
very little has been said about the Spanish auction format. To our knowledge, the properties 
of the Spanish auction mechanism have been study only by Salinas (90) and Martinez Mendez 
(96). Salinas presents a model where demand is restricted to one unit per bidder, and each 
bidder's reservation price for the good is an independent draw for the same distribution. He 
uses the results of Maskin and Riley (89) to argue that the Spanish mechanism generates the 
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same expected revenue than uniform and discriminatory auctions. But these two assumptions 
are not appropriate for Treasury auctions: bidders usually bid for more than one unit and the 
value of the good is assumed to be common but unknown for all bidders. given the existence 
of a secondary market. Martinez Mendez (96) offers a detailed technical description of both 
primary and secondary market for government securities in Spain and discusses the principal 
aspects of the Spanish auction. 
Besides the auction format, Spain (and Hungary for bills of certain maturity), is the only 
country that has opted "for the extreme solution of not even announcing the amount of bills 
to be issued", as noted by Bartolini and Cottarelli (94). The authors mention that all other 
41 countries in the sample they use, announce the volume of the auction. even if most of 
them maintain downward flexibility on the issue. This practice has changed since 1995. when 
the Spanish Treasury started to announce a maximum amount and a target to be issued. But 
there is still uncertainty on the amount auctioned, both because the target is not compUlsory. 
and because both the maximum and the target figures are announced jointly for two different 
bonds, that are auctioned separately. 
The general director of the Spanish Treasury, Jaime Caruana. mentioned recently that "the 
adoption of the euro will establish a more efficient market. in which the Spanish debt will 
have to compete with other countries' debt on interest rates, credit quality and calendar" (E1 
Pais, April 14, 1998). Although he did not mention that it will have to compete with a 
different auction mechanism, his statement calls attention on the fact that competition will 
increase after 1999. Thus, it is important to establish the characteristics of the Spanish 
auction mechanism, both from the point of view of the seller and the buyers. 
This paper explores the revenue efficiency of the Spanish Treasury auctions. First, we 
present a stylized game theoretical model that captures the two distinctive features of the 
Spanish auction: the hybrid system of uniform and discriminatory auctions used; and the 
uncertainty about the amount to be issued. We find the pure strategy Nash equilibria, and 
compare it with the equilibrium of a discriminatory auction in the same model. We show 
that, under the assumptions of the model, the auction format used in Spain is equivalent it 
terms of revenue to the seller to the discriminatory format, and that both formats maximize 
the seller's revenue. Second, we present an empiricaJ analysis, using data of Spanish bond 
auctions between 1993 and 1997, to test the predictions of the mndel and to establish the 
main characteristics of the Spanish bond auctions. We present summary statistics for the data. 
that evidence the good functioning of the market, and the relatively low price differentials 
paid by accepted bids. We test revenue efficiency and study the determinants of the price 
differential of auction prices with secondary market prices. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the auction rules for the Spanish 
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auction. In section 3 we present the theoretical model: 3.1 surveys the theoretical literature, 
3.2 presents the model, 3.3 presents the results and 3.4 concludes the theoretical part 
stating the implications of the model for the empirical analysis. In section 4 we present the 
empirical analysis: 4.1 describes the data and 4.2 presents the empirical analysis results. We 
conclude in section 5. 
2. AUCTION RULES 
Spanish Treasury bond auctions follow a regular calendar that is announced annually. 
usually in February. At present, bonds are issued monthly except for 30-years bonds that are 
auctioned every two months. Auctions for 3- and 5-years bonds take place, separately, on 
the Tuesday following the last Monday in each month, and auctions for 5- and IS-years 
bonds take place, also separately, on the next day. Auctions for 30-years bonds take place 
the same day that those for 3- and lO-years bonds. Since February 1998 the settlement date 
for issued securities is 3 days after auction, but before that date settlement was around to 
days after auction. 
Government bond issues are reopened through successive auctions; that is, bonds with 
identical coupon, maturity and coupon payment dates are successively auctioned until the 
volume outstanding reaches a certain size. Therefore, each issue remains open a variable 
number of auctions, depending on demand. The main objective of this policy (used by other 
countries such as France, UK, ha1y and Japan) is to encourage development of the secondary 
market and to avoid attempts at cornering the market. 
Since each issue remains open for a number of auctions not known when the annual calendar 
is set, the announcement of the nominal features of the bonds to be auctioned are made some 
two weeks before auction takes place. The announcement does not include the volume to be 
issued. This practice, which is a singular feature of the Spanish system, was partially 
abandoned three years ago. Thus, since July 1995 the Treasury establishes a (compulsory) 
minimum amount to be issued: 30 billion Ptas. in each auction for 3, 5 and to years bonds, 
and 15 billion Ptas. for 15 year bonds. Besides, the Friday before the auction takes place, 
the Treasury announces, after consultation with market makers, a maximum and a target 
amount offered. Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty on the volume to be issued, first 
because the target amount is not compulsory and second because both maximum and target 
figures are set jointly for auctions of 3 and 10 years bonds on one hand and for auctions of 
5 and 15 years bonds on the other. 
Any investor, whether resident or non-resident, can participate in the market submitting 
competitive or non-competitive bids. Participation may be direct or through a member of the 
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public debt marketl• 
Non-competitive bids are subject to a limit of 25 million Ptas. per bidder, which is small 
compared to the average size of a trade in the secondary market among members, which is 
about 760 million. Competitive bids are subject to a (low) minimum limit of 500,000 Ptas. 
but do not have a maximum limit and the number of bids submitted by any single investor 
is unrestricted. 
Direct bids by a non-member of the public debt market have to be submitted up to one day 
in advance of auction day and are subject to a disbursement of 2 % of the bid. In contrast, 
bids by members of the public debt market do not require disbursement and have to be 
submitted between 8.30 and 10.30 a.m. on auction day. 
Auction resolution takes place before noon and determines the accepted volume and the 
minimum accepted price and the weighted average price of accepted bids (hereafter, stop out 
price and WAP respectively). Non-competitive bids are fully awarded at the WAP. 
Competitive bids below the WAP are awarded at the bid price and bids above it pay the 
WAP. As mentioned earlier, this auction format is only used by the Spanish Treasury. All 
other Treasuries use either discriminatory or uniform formats. 
Immediately after resolution, auction results are made public. Information includes total 
volume submitted, total volume accepted, non-competitive volume submitted; WAP and yield 
of accepted bids; stop out price and yield; nominaJ vaJue placed at the stop out price; first 
non-accepted price and quantity bid at that price. Some days later, the officiaJ government 
gazette publishes the same information plus the total amount placed at the WAP and the 
amounts placed at each particular price between the W AP and the stopout price. There is no 
public information on the number of bids or bidders. 
Immediately after auc�ion results are published, a second-round auction may take place where 
only market makers can participate. Thus, if no volume is pre-announced for the ordinary 
auction, or if a volume is announced and fully covered, the Treasury opens a mandatory 
second-round auction!. In this round, each market maker may (voluntarily) submit up to 
I Almost any financiaJ institution can be a member of the public debt market. For a 
description of Spanish bond market organization see Pellicer(92). 
2 If a volume was pre-announced for the first round auction and less than 70 % of it is 
placed, the second-round auction is not mandatory. This has never been the case in the period 
under study even since July 1995, when the Treasury started to announce a maximum and 
a target amount to be issued, since it has been interpreted that these figures do not qualify 
as a formal announced volume. 
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three bids at prices higher or equal to the W AP prevailing in the first-round auction. 
Accepted bids pay the bid price, so these auctions follow a discriminatory format. Provided 
that there is enough demand, the Treasury is obliged to place at least a specific amoun�. 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.1 Survey of the literature 
As mentioned above, a principal aim of auction theory is to identify the auction mechanism 
that maximizes the expected revenue of sellers. Most of the theory refers to auctions of 
indivisible goods, and compares uniform price auctions (second-price auctions) with 
discriminatory auctions (first-price auctions). Milgrom and Weber (82) show that if the good 
is indivisible, the bidders are risk-neutral and bidders' valuations are affiliated\ uniform 
price auctions yield at least as large revenue as discriminatory auctions. Revenue is equal for 
both auction formats if independent private values are assumed. while uniform price 
auctions yield more revenue than discriminatory auctions if common values are assumed. The 
idea is that the winner's cursd is less severe in a uniform price auction, and bidders bid 
more aggressively. In general, Treasury auctions are considered common value auctions. But 
as Ranjan Das and Sundaram (97) note, �the one clear conclusion to have come out of recent 
theoretical studies is that no useful lesson on Treasury auction format can be gained from the 
study of auctions of indivisible goods": the assumption on the indivisibility of the good being 
auctioned is critical in the Milgrom and Weber result. 
Back and Zender (93), Wang and Zender (98) and Asubel and Cramton (98) address the issue 
310% if accepted competitive bids are, in nominal terms, higher than 50% of the total 
quantity bid, and 20% otherwise. 
4Affiliation implies that the bidders' valuations are positively correlated, and includes the two 
most usual assumptions about valuations, i.e. independent private values and common values, 
as special cases. In an independent private value model, bidders' valuations are independent, 
while in a common value model, the value of the item to be auctioned is common but 
unknown. 
� The winner's curse can arise in common value ,models. In such models, bidders base their 
bid on their estimate of the item's value; this raises the possibility that winning is bad news: 
a bidder wins if all other bidders estimated the common value to be lower. 
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of ranking uniform and discriminatory auctions in terms of seller revenues, in the case of 
divisible goods, with smooth demand schedules. Wang and Zender (97) obtain an analytical 
solution and fully characterize the set of equilibria under risk neutrality and constant absolute 
risk aversion utility. They use the common value assumption: the good being sold has an 
unknown value; this is the usual assumption for Treasury security auctions, given the 
existence of a secondary market. In their model, and assuming that the noncompetitive 
demand is uniformly distributed, if bidders are risk-neutral, the expected revenue in a 
uniform auction is smaller than in a discriminatory auction in almost all equilibria of a 
uniform-price auction. If bidders are risk-averse, the result is ambiguous. This result follows 
because they obtain a continuum of equilibria for the uniform price auction. In some of the 
equilibria, the ability to submit very steep demand curves provides the bidders with an 
important strategic advantage. Asubel and Cramton (98) also establish that the ranking of 
uniform and discriminatory auctions is ambiguous: they are able to construct reasonable 
specifications of demand where the discriminatoy auction dominates the uniform auction on 
expected revenue for the seller, and equally-reasonable specifications of demand where the 
reverse ranking holds. Thus, they conclude that the choice between auction formats ought 
to be viewed as an empirical question that depends on the actual nature of demands. 
Menezes (95) considers a discriminatory auction with supply uncertainty and shows that there 
is a unique pure Nash equilibrium that maximizes the sellers' revenue. He assumes that a 
bid is one price-quantity pair, and captures supply uncertainty introducing a positive 
probability that the bidders with the lowest price bid may not receive an allocation. 
We adapt Menezes' (95) model to represent the Spanish auction format. Therefore. each 
bidder submits one price-quantity pair, and supply uncertainty is introduced as a positive 
probability of receiving a zero award. In the Spanish Treasury's auctions, bidders use 
multiple bids, and therefore the first assumption must be considered only as an initial 
approximation. The introduction of uncertainty as a positive probability of receiving a zero 
award seems appropriate for the Spanish case, where the Treasury has the option of cutting 
the announced supply objective, and awarding zero to the bidders with the lowest price bid, 
even if the announced target Quantity is not sold. 
3.2. The model 
We adapt Menezes' (95) model to the Spanish auction format. The auction rules are as 
follows. The auctioneer announces a minimum price po and an objective for the quantity he 
wants to sell, Y. Without loss of generality, we assume that pO = 0 and that there are two 
risk-neutral competitive bidders, denoted by I and 2. Their bids have two components: a 
price and a Quantity, stating the price they are willing to pay for the specified amount of the 
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securities auctioned. 
Let x and y be, respectively, the quantities demanded by bidders I and 2. The auctioneer 
orders the bids according to the price. starting from the highest, until the total amount that 
he wants to sell, Y, is awarded. Following Menezes. we assume that if there is a tie, that is, 
if both bidders submit the same price-bid, there are two possible cases: (i) if the sum of their 
bids is less than or equal to Y, each bidder receives the amount requested; (ii) if the sum of 
their bids is greater than Y, each bidder receives a quantity proportional to his bid. Define 
the cut-off price, p, as the highest price at which aggregate demand is equal to the quantity 
offered, or the lowest submitted price if (pix +y 2: YJ = 121. 
Each bidder i, i = 1,2. is characterized by a demand function D;(p), which specifies for each 
price pE [0, p+] the desired quantity. We assume that D,(p+) = ° for i = 1,2, and that 
1:,.,'D,(O) > 0. 
We assume that the demand functions are continuous and strictly decreasing. These demand 
functions are common knowledge for the bidders. but not for the auctionee�. Refer to p* 
as the price such that market clears. Therefore D; (p*) denotes bidder i' s demand at the 
market clearing price. Given our assumptions. if there is a market clearing price, it is 
unique. 
Competitive bidders have a positive probability of having a zero award: if they bid the lowest 
price, there is a positive probability of receiving zero. Let Hp):[p',p+]-[O, I] be the 
probability function that determines, for each cut-off price P. the probability that the player 
submitting this bid will not receive his award. We assume that Hp) is continuous and 
decreasing in p, with HO)= l. That is. the player that bids the lowest price has a positive 
probability (and higher the lower his price bid is). of having a zero award. And if both price 
bids are equal, both players face this probability. Following Menezes, we assume that Hp) 
= ° for p E [p', p+l'. 
A bidding strategy for bidder i, b,(D,(p), D;(p), Hp)), j .,. i, is a mapping from i's 
information set into his set of actions. Hence a strategy for player I, bl(.), is a pair (p,x), 
representing a price and a quantity demanded at that price. Denote by (q,y) the price and 
6-Jbis assuption is in Menezes' model. The auctioneer does not know the demand 
functions, because otherwise he/she would use a take-it-or-leave-it type of mechanism. 
7If we consider p* as the expected price in the secondary market, known to alJ 
participants in the market, it could be argued that the Treasury would supply the announced 
quantity Y if bid prices are equal or greater than p*, but, with a positive probability, would 
reduce Y if bid prices are below p'. 
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quantity bid by player 2. 
Let T;:BIX� .... R denote the payoff function for player i,  where B; denotes the feasible bid 
for player i. Thus, given the auction rules, player l's payoff function, TI[p.X,q,y]. follows 
from the following considerations: 
(i) If p > q, player I receives with probability I the amount of his bid, and the cut-<>ff 
price is q. His payoff is equal to the area under the demand curve minus the price 
that he pays, which depends on the price-quantity bid of player 2: with probability 
[I-Hq)] player 2 receives at price q a positive quantity of the good, and player I pays 
the average price, which varies depending on whether x +y � Y, when player 2 
receives quantity y, or x+y> Y, when player 2 receives (Y-x); and with probability 
Hq), player 2 receives 0, arid the price player I pays is p. 
(ii) If P s q, player I pays p, the cut-<>ff price is p, and therefore player I has a 
probability [I-Hp)] of receiving a positive amount of the good, which will be equal 
to [x/(x+y)]Y if p=q and x+y > Y; equal to (Y-y) if p<q and x+y> Y; and equal 
to x if psq and x+ySY. 
Therefore, TI[P,X,q,y] is defined as follows (with a similar definition for player 2): 
f.x -1 px+qy D, (w) dw - [1-�(q)]-- x - �(q)px 
o x+y 
J:D,-'(w) dw - [l_�(q)]px+q�y-X) x - �(q)px 
if p>q II x+y<Y 
if p>q 1\ x+y> Y 
2-, 
[f. '" D,-'(w) dw - p2-Y] [l-�(P)] if p:q 1\ x+y>Y 
o x+y 
[/.'-'D,-'(w) dw - p(Y-y)] [l-�(P)] if p<q II x+y>Y 
[J:D,-'(w) dw -px] [l-�(P)] if p<q 1\ x+y<Y 
Thus, the auction game is defined by the set of competitive players, i= 1,2, their strategy 
space, Bj and their payoff function 'J'j. To simplify notation, let b=:(bl' b2), and BiiiiBlx�. 
- Define R;(b;l, for i, j = 1,2, i ¢j, as R,(b;l = {b, E 8,1 .. , (b" bj) = max.· E� .. , (b:, bj»). 
And define a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the auction game as a pair of vectors b* such 
that b* E R,(b,*)xR,(b,*). 
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3.3 The equilibria 
OUT main result is to find a Nash equilibrium for the Spanish auction. 
Proposition I: The profile b* = (p*, D,(p*), pO, D, (p*)) is a Nash equilibrium of the �. 
auction game, where p* is such that D,(p*) + Dip·) = Y. if the following c:ondilion is 
satisfied for any price p E (p', p', and a fixed amount z: 
i3( r D'-'(w) dw - pz) 
I Jo"Wf;.Z I i!p J, D'-
'(w) dw - pz 
< -'-"0'"."'' '---,---,,.,-,-__ H(P) 
1,2 (I) 
The above condition states that the demand functions and the �·function are such that, for 
any fixed amount, bidders prefer to pay a slightly higher price to receive an award z with a 
slightly higher probability. Note that the proposition is the same as Menezes' (95) result for 
discriminatory auctions': we prove that the equilibrium he proposes is also an equilibrium 
for the Spanish auction. 
Proo!, 
Suppose that player 2 submits a bid (p*. D,(p*)). Player I can: 
i) Bid (p < p', x). Player 2 gets D,(p') with probability I ,  given that player 1 bids 
the lower price, and player 1 pays price p and receives at most 01 (p*). Since p < p* 
and demand is strictly decreasing. x = OI(P*) maximizes his payoff function 9. 
ii) Bid (p=p*. x). He pays p*. There are two cases: If x:::; OI(P*), he receives x with 
probability I. and therefore it is optimal to bid 01 (p*). If X �OI(P*). the optimal 
x solves the following problem: 
3 Menezes' proposition establishes that the equilibrium is unique. which is not true in the 
Spanish case, and assumes that demand functions are identical for both players. 
9 Note that any x> OJ (p*) also maximizes his payoff function for p < p*. 
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Ignoring the restriction. first order conditions imply that it is optimal to bid x = 
D,(p*) if p=p*. Since the restriction holds. we conclude that x = D,(p*) if p=p* 
is the solution to the problem. 
iii) Bid (p>p*,x). He receives x with probability 1, and the price he pays varies. If 
x >D,(p*), x+D,(p*» Y, and he pays [px+P*(Y_X)]/Y]IO, If x ";D,(p*), 
x+D,(p*)";Y, and he pays [px+p*D(p*)]/[x+D(p*)], 
Given p > p*, which quantity maximizes his payoff? 
- A bid x > D1(p*» is not optimal, since player 1 receives x with probability 
1, pays a price greater than p* and demand is strictly decreasing. 
- Consider a bid x � D,(p*». Player 1 chooses x to solve the following 
problem 
Ignoring the restriction, first order conditions imply 
px + p'D,(P'» x 
x + D,(P') x + D,(P') 
10 Note that since player 2 bids at price p*. he gets a positive amount with probabilty 1. 
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The right-hand-side term is positive, since p>p* and x > 0, and it follows 
that the optimal x for player I is lower than D,([px +p"D,(p*»)/[x + 
D,(p"))), and therefore lower than D,(p"). Notice that the fact that player 1 
bids for x < D,([px +p"D,(p"»)/[x + D,(p"))) is a particularity of the 
Spanish case: since a higher x increases the price he has to pay, player I 
lowers his quantity bid below the quantity demanded at the price he has to 
pay. 
Since the restriction holds, we conclude that if p>p*. x. < DL(p*). 
But bids i) and iii) are dominated by ii): 
- Bid i), (p < p", D,(p*» is dominated by bid ii), (p",D,(p")). This result is identical 
to that of Menezes, and follows from the assumption of the proposition. The result 
follows because the assumption implies that bidders prefer to pay a slightly higher 
price to receive an award with a slightly higher probability. 
- Bid iii), (p>p*, x < D,(p*» is dominated by bid ii), (p", D,(p*». The payoff that 
player I gets with bid (p*, D,(p*» is given by 
It is possible to rewrite the above ex.pression as 
Px+pOD (PO) [J,'D,-\w)dw - ' xl + o x+D,(P0) 
+ [J,D1(P"D,-'(w)dw - p O(D,(P O)_x)1 + 
px+poD (PO) + [( , pO) xl x+D,(P 0) 
The first bracket is player I payoff when he bids (p>p*. x < D,(p*». ",(p. x, p*, 
Dip·»; since the second and the third brackets are positive, it follows that 
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We have shown that (p*, DJ(p*» is a best response to (p*, Dip*». For reasons of 
symmetry, the converse is also true, and therefore we have shown that b* = (p*, Dj(p*). 
pO, D,(p')) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Corollary 1: Profiles b*� (p*, x, pO, y), for x and y such that x+y ., Y, Ddp*) 
(xy)l(x+y) and D,(p*) � (yY)I(x+y), are pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
Note that in all the equilibria of Corollary I. each bidder receives the same amount. Dj(p*) 
and Dip*), respectively. pays the same price, p"', and the seller gets the same revenue. 
Therefore utilities for all players are equal in the set of proposed equilibria. The proof of 
Corollary I is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. and is in the Appendix I. Corollary 2 
establishes that there are not other equilibria. 
Corollary 2: There are not other pure strategy Nash equilibria than the set proposed in 
Corollary 1. 
Proof of Corollary 2: 
First, we show that in any Nash equilibrium, both bidders bid the same price. Suppose that 
there is a Nash equilibrium where player 1 bids (p, x) and player 2 bids (q, y), for p>q. 
Bidder I can increase his profits bidding (q+E, x'), for e>O and x' such that this maximizes 
his profits given the price he has to pay. He receives x· with probability one and pays a 
lower price. 
Next, we show that there is not a Nash equilibrium where both bidders bid p > p ...  If that is 
the case, both of them have incentives to lower their price bids. Suppose that there is a Nash 
equilibrium where player I bids (p, xl and player 2 bids (p, y), for p> p'. Note that in any 
such,equilibrium, x +y:;:; Y. and therefore both players have an incentive to lower p to p*, 
since they receive their quantity bid with probability one and pay a lower price. 
Finally, suppose there is a Nash equilibrium where both bidders bid p<p"', Both of them 
have an incentive to raise their price, given (1). This concludes the proof of the Corollary. 
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3.4 Testable implications of the model 
Our model predicts that the Spanish auction has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, in which 
the seller's revenue is maximized. 
Given that we only observe data from one type of auction, the Spanish one, it is not possible 
to test one auction mechanism versus the other in terms of revenue efficiency. To test the 
prediction of the model, we follow the usual practice in the empirical literature, and calculate 
the difference between when-issued or secondary market prices and auction prices, i.e. the 
auction discount. Since the Treasury's revenues cannot increase by more than the bidders' 
current profits, i.e. the auction discount, if the discount is small and statistically insignificant, 
it would support the model, in the sense that it maximizes the seller's revenue. 
Since in the model bidders know the demand of rivals and the market clearing price, it seems 
that the model is more appropriate for auctions where the bond being issued has been 
auctioned in previous months (hereafter. reopening auctions) than for auctions where the 
bond is issued for the first time (hereafter, initial auctions). This is because in reopening 
auctions bidders have, probably, more price information than in initial auctions, given that 
an identical bond to that being auctioned is trading in the secondary market. Also, in the 
model the seller announces the quantity that he wants to sell, but there is supply uncertainty. 
since bidders face a positive probability of receiving a zero award if they bid the lowest price 
even if the final volume issued is lower than the one announced. Therefore, we consider that 
the model is more appropiate for auctions with volume announcement, since the target 
volume announced is not compulsory. 
Summarizing, the model predicts that auction discounts in reopening auctions with non­
compulsory volume announcement are small in size and statistically no significant. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Empirical investigation of auctions is motivat� mainly by one reason: auctions are very 
complicated games, so that auctions models, such as the one explained in section 3, abstract 
from many characteristics of real auctions and the predictions of the theoretical model need 
to be tested to see if they hold in more complicated environments. 
Most empirical studies try to test whether the auction format used is revenue-efficient, from 
the seller's point of view, by examining the auction discount defined as the price differential 
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between secondary market prices and auction pricesll, where secondary market prices are 
used as a proxy for the true value of the bond. If the bond has not been auctioned before, 
when-issued market prices are used, and if the auction is a reopening, so that there is an 
identical bond being traded in the secondary market, spot secondary market prices are used. 
If the auction format is revenue-efficient the auction discount should not be significantly 
different from zero. In table I ,  empirical results found in the literature are summarized. 
Results are mixed for discriminatory auctions. On the contrary, and with some exception, 
a statistically non-significant auction discount is found for uniform auctions. 
Many of the empirical studies also examine determinants of auction discount. Examples of 
such analysis are: Berg (96), Breedom and Ganley (96), Cammack (91), Hamao and 
Jegadeesh (97), Scalia (97), Spindt and Stolz (92) and Umlauf (93). These studies have in 
common that they look, essentially, for two possible determinants of auction discou"t, 
namely uncertainty about the true value of the security and the level of competition among 
bidders, although they differ in the proxies used for such variables, in the inclusion of other 
explanatory variables and in the results they obtain. Nevertheless. since there is not a 
generally accepted model for multiple-unit and multiple-bid auctions with a resale market, 
empirical models are somehow ad hoc. Then, the inclusion of variables as regressors for the 
auction discount relies on the grounds of having some weight in the determination of the 
auction price in some of the existing simple theoretical models. And most of the studies rely 
on the predictions of one unit auctions theory. 
4.1 Data description 
The data sample consists of individual bids for 3, 5, 10 and 15-year bond auctions held 
between January 1993 and August 199712• For each bid the data include identification code 
of the bidder, quantity and price bid, quantity accepted. price to be paid (if accepted) and 
date when bid is made. The sample covers data for 192 auctions, 29 of which are initial 
auctions. (the bond is issued for the tirst time). and 163 are reopenings (auctions of bonds 
with the same coupon and maturity as a previously issued bond). 
Secondary market data includes two sets of prices: the first set are quoted prices (average of 
bid and ask quotes). The second set consists of individual traded prices in the secondary 
II  Some studies perform the analysis by examining yields diferentials, auction yield minus 
secondary market yields, instead of price diferentials. 
12 These data have been provided by the Domestic Operations Department of the Banco de 
Espana. 
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market among members. In both cases, secondary market prices are adjusted to the 
settlement date of the auctioned bond using repo rates!3. For initial auctions, secondary 
market prices correspond to the when-issued market]4. 
4.2 Empirical analysis results 
The empirical analysis of the Spanish auctions of government bonds presented in this paper 
is divided into three parts: examination of general features of the functioning of Spanish 
auctions; test of revenue efficiency; and analysis of possible determinants of the auction 
discount. 
4.2.1 Summary characteristics of auctions results 
Column I of table 2.A and table A.I in the Appendix 2, summarize the results of Spanish 
government bond auctions. In brief, the principal features are as follows: 
1. In terms of volume, non-competitive bids are insignificant. On average non-competitive 
bids represent only 0.7% of total volume bid and 1.4% of total volume issued. In 
practice, then, auctions are mostly competitive. 
2. Competitive participation is. in relative terms, high. On average, there are 31 bidders 
submitting at least one competitive bid. Although this figure is small compared with 
other government bond auctions like the Italian case, where there are about 60 bidders 
in each auction, it is high if we take into consideration that participation in the Spanish 
bond secondary market for all outstanding bonds averages about 50 participants daily. 
13 That is: if secondary market price at t (P\.) corresponds to settlement date in Ts days and 
settlement of the auctioned bond is in Ta days (T. < =T.), the secondary market adjusted 
price (P\.) will be calculated as: 
I I Ta-Ts Ta-Tc PTa+CCTa =(Pn+ccn)(l +rl3'6() -eel +rl-W-) 
where: 
cc = acrued interest; 
r= repo rale al I for (Ta-Ts) days; 
C= coupon, ifTa<Tc<Ts, 0 otherwise 
14 In many bond markets bonds are traded before the bond is issued. This market is called 
when-issued and it is a forward market with settlement date on the date the bond is to be 
issued. 
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3. On average there are 31 non-competitive bids, 14 of which correspond to bidders who 
also submitt competitive bids. Nevertheless, the small size of the maximum amount 
allowed for non-competitive bids (25 million Ptas. versus the 760 million Ptas. of the 
average trade in the secondary market among members) suggests that non-competitive 
bids are submitted in order to cover compromises with clients more than to avoid the 
competitive game. 
4. Bidders submit, in average, 2.7 competitive bids. In practice, then, auctions are 
multiple bid games. 
5 . . Competition level, measured by the ratio of volume submitted in competitive bids to 
volume accepted (cover ratio) is comparable to competition level in other bond auctions 
markets. Thus, for the Spanish bond auctions, the average cover ratio is 3.1. while it 
is 2.04 for Ita1ian bond auctions and 3.9 for Japanese bond auctions. In terms of 
number of bids, competition is lower: the ratio of total competitive bids to accepted 
bids is 2.3. 
6. On average, most volume awarded is at the bid price (57.9%) while most bids are 
awarded at the weighted average price. 
7. Price differential paid by accepted bids (WAP minus stop-out price) is relatively low: 
0.10 on average, smaller than the bid-ask spread in the secondary market that averages 
0.18 for the sample used. and to other bond auction markets like the Japanese where 
this figure is 0.12. Also, standard deviation of prices paid by winning bids is low 
(0.036). On the contrary, the bid price range of accepted bids is quite high 3.5. That 
is, meanwhile most bids come at very similar prices, there are, generally, a few bids 
at prices far above. This suggests that there may be a few bidders, who are in fact 
playing as non-competitive bidders IS: by bidding at very high prices they insure 
themselves against not getting the security, avoiding the quantity limit imposed in non­
competitive bids and paying the same price (the W AP). albeit with a cost, since 
bidding very aggressively increases the average price. 
These general comments are for the whole sample. However, as mentioned before, the 
sample includes two different types of auctions: the initial auctions and the reopening 
auctions. The only difference between them is an important one: for the reopenings there is 
15 Although on some occasions the wide range of accepted bid prices is due to errors at the 
time of submitting the bid, the persistence of this wide range suggests something else. 
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a secondary market that provides an alternative market for the same security and, 
particularly, price information, but for the initial auctions, although there ex.ists a when­
issued market that could play the same informational role, it is not very liquid in practice. 
For instance, only 9 of the 29 initial auctions covered by the sample have when-issued 
operations the day before auction. Hence, the theoretical model developed in section 3, albeit 
with limitations, replicates better the reopening auctions than the initial ones, for which price 
information is, probably, poorer. 
Columns 2 and 3 of table 2.A summarize general features of the functioning of Spanish bond 
auctions for the initial and reopening auctions, respectively. On average, demand is bigger 
for initial auctions. Thus, average bid volume, number of bids and number of bidders per 
auction are higher in initial auctions. Potentially, the practice of reopening auctions may have 
either a positive or a negative effect on demand: on the one hand, demand can be reduced 
because there is an alternative market for the very same security; and on the other, better 
information provided by the secondary market may encourage participation. It seems that in 
average, the negative effect overcomes the positive. The other side of the market, the supply 
side, also seems bigger for initial auctions: average volume issued and target amount to be 
issued are higher for them. The reason for a bigger supply in initial auctions may be as that 
for using the practice of reopening, that is, an issue with a small size is more easily 
cornered, and the Treasury wishes to avoid that. 
Nevertheless, cover ratios in terms of volume ( bid volume/awarded volume) and in terms 
of number of bids (number of bids/number of winning bids) are higher for reopenings. This 
suggests that competition is higher for reopenings, so that the decrease in demand from initial 
auctions to reopenings is, in relative terms, smaller than the decrease in supplyL6. On the 
other hand, range prices (W AP minus stop-out price, maximum bid price minus stop-out 
price and maximum bid price minus minimum bid price) are smaller for reopenings, which 
is consistent with the notion that reopenings benefit from better information through the 
secondary market. 
As mentioned before, one peculiar feature of the Spanish auctions is that up to 1995 there 
was no announcement about offered volume. The practice changed in July 1995, and 
although there is still quantity uncertainty, the change can be considered an important one 
and may have had an effect on auction results. To this end, tables 2.B and A.1  in the 
Appendix 2 summarize auction results distinguishing between auctions with no announcement 
(the ones before July 1995) from the ones with one (from July 1995 on). The main 
16 A higher cover ratio could also be explained by a poorer information of bidders, but this 
explanation seems less reasonable than that given in the text, since the secondary market for 
reopenings provides information that initial auctions lack. 
- 23 -
conclusion of this analysis is that price dispersion of bids is lower for auctions with an 
announcement, which is consistent with the idea that volume announcement decreases 
uncertainty faced by bidders. Nevertheless, the lower dispersion could be also due to a less 
volatile financial environment from 1995 onwards than during 1 993-1995. 
4.2.2 Testing revenue efficiency 
As mentioned earlier, auction revenue efficiency is empirically tested by examining auction 
discount defined as the difference between secondary market price and auction price. If the 
auction is revenue-efficient, auction discount should not be statistically different from zero. 
In order to calculate auction discounts, for auction price we use the weighted average of paid 
prices17 (hereafter, W APT). For secondary market prices two data sets are used: average 
of quoted prices and average traded prices. Neither is problem-free since calculation of the 
relevant auction discount should use secondary market prices at the time bids are submitted 
(before 10.30 a.m. on the auction day). Unfortunately, such prices are not available. Quoted 
prices available correspond to 5 .00 p.m. and traded prices are averages of traded prices 
during the day". With these limitations, the most appropriate comparison between auction 
prices and secondary market prices is, probably, to use quoted prices the day before the 
auction (bearing in mind that prices could have changed between 5.00 p.m. and the next 
morning) or, as a second best, to use auction day average traded prices (taking into account 
that they could have been affected by any price change after the auction). In any event, in 
order to be more confident about results, auction discounts have been calculated using quoted 
and traded prices for the day before the auction and the auction day. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for auction discounts. When all auctions are taken into 
consideration the auction discount is positive and statisticaJly different from zero. 
Nevertheless, the auction discount is small in size, their mean value being smaller than the 
secondary market bid-ask spread, which averages 0.18 for the sample. 
However, since initial and reopening auctions are different, it seems appropriate to separate 
them when analyzing auction discounts. The results of such analysis are reported in rows 3 
17 Notice \bat in discriminatory auctions the weighted average price paid to the Treasury is 
the WAP. For the Spanish case the WAP is the maximum price paid to the Treasury but the 
average price paid to the Treasury is the WAPT, where WAPT,;; WAP. 
II We do have information about each individual trade, but not about the time of the day the 
trade is made. 
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to 6 of table 3. For initial auctions the discount is statistically significantl9 and with a mean 
value higher than the secondary market bid-ask spread, which for the corresponding 
observations averages 0.26. For reopening auctions, the discount is statistically significant 
but with a mean value that is smalJer than the secondary market bid-ask spread, that averages 
0. 16 for the corresponding observations, and much smaller than the mean value for initial 
auctions. Hence. results indicate that when there is less uncertainty about prices, the auction 
discount is lower. This result is consistent with predictions of the single-unit auction theory: 
the less uncertainty about the value of the good to be auctioned, the lower the winners' curse, 
and therefore bidders bid more aggressively so that the selling price increases. Nevertheless, 
it should be mentioned that the positive and higher auction discount found for initial auctions 
compared to reopenings could be explained not only by poorer price information but also by 
greater supply: the Treasury may be willing to issue at a discount with respect to the 
secondary market in order to avoid launching an issue of a small size that could be easily 
cornered. 
Next, the auction discount analysis is performed separating not only initial auctions from 
reopenings but also auctions without volume announcement from those with it. The 
corresponding results are reported in rows 7 to 14 of table 3. As before, for initial auctions 
the auction discount is statistically significant with a positive sign and a high mean value in 
both cases, i.e. whithout and with volume annuoncement (rows 7 to 10 of table 3). 
With respect to reopening auctions, auction discount is positive and statistically significant 
for auctions without volume announcement (rows I I  and 12 of table 3), although they are 
smaller in value than the corresponding auction discount for intitial auctions. For auctions 
with volume announcement, i.e. for reopening auctions from July 1995 on, the auction 
discount is statistically non-different from zero. This is consistent with predictions of the 
mooel presented in section 3. Notice, first that the model has volume announcement although 
there is uncertainty about the final amount issued. This is the case for the Spanish auctions 
since July 1995: the Treasury announces a non-compUlsory target amount to be issued. 
Second, in the mooe! bidders know the demand of rivals and the market clearing price. 
Therefore, the mooel probably characterizes better reopening auctions during a perioo with 
less market volatility as is the case after July 1995. Hence, we conclude that the results are 
consistent with the mooe!. 
19 The number of observations for the initial auctions is very small since the when-issued 
market is not liquid, so t-statistic should be analyzed carefully. However. a large majority 
of observations yields a positive auction discount which gives some support to the sign of the 
mean value. 
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4.2.3 Auction discount determinants 
As mentioned earlier, the absence of a generally accepted model for multiple-bid multiple­
unit auctions implies that the empirical analysis of auction discount determinants contains ad­
hoc elements. The approach taken for most of the empirical work on the subject is to test if 
predictions of single-unit single-bid auction models hold in bond auctions. In such theoretical 
models, auction participation, auction competition and uncertainty about the true value of the 
security are factors that affect auction discounts. Therefore, proxies for these variables are 
generally used as explanatory variables of auction discounts. 
In single-unit single-bid auction models with a finite number of players, the effect of an 
increase in participation, i.e. the effect of an increase in the number of bidders, has an 
ambiguous effect on auction discounts (see, for example, the explanation given in 
Umlauf( l 993». On one hand, when the number of bidders increases the winner's curselO 
is more severe, inducing lower bidding, and hence increasing auction discounts. On the 
other, in single-unit single-bid models, an increase in the number of bidders implies an 
increase in competition21, reducing the probability of winning, and therefore inducing higher 
bidding and hence decreasing auction discounts. Wilson (1988) argues that for most plausible 
examples the increase in competition is the stronger of the two effects. 
However, in multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions an increase in participation does not 
necessarily imply an increase in competition, since the offered volume may vary as well. 
For this reason, in the empirical analysis presented here we use as regressors both 
participation and competition. Participation is measured by the number of bidders submitting 
at least one competitive bid (BIDDERS) and it is expected to have a positive effect on auction 
discounts. Competition is proxied by the cover ratio (COVERC), defined as the competitive 
volume of bids over competitive volume accepted, and it is expected to have a negative effect 
on auction discounts. 
As concerns the inclusion of price uncertainty as an explanatory variable of the auction 
discount, it is argued (for example by Umlauf(1993), Berg(l997), Hamao and Jegadeesh 
(1997)) that the marginal probability of losing an auction by lowering the bid by a given 
amount decreases with pricing risk. Hence, price uncertainty is expected to have a negative 
effect on auction price and, therefore. a positive effect on auction discount. Price uncertainty, 
20 For an explanation of the winner's curse see footnote 5. 
21 Measuring competition by volume bid over volume offered, in single-unit single-bid models 
competition takes a value equal to the number of bidders. Hence, in such models competition 
and participation take the same value. 
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which is not observable, is proxied by bond market volatility (VOLATILITY)22. 
But for Spanish bond auctions, bidders face not only price uncertainty but also quantity 
uncertainty, which could also affect auction discount. Unfortunately, quantity uncertainty is 
difficult to measure. As mentioned several times, in July 1995 the Spanish Treasury started 
to make (non-compulsory) quantity announcements. Thus, a tentative solution to measure the 
effect of quantity information could be to use as a regressor a dummy variable 
(DANNOUNCE, taking value 0 up to July 1995 and I since then). However, such a dummy 
could capture another effect: the decrease in bond market volatility observed since mid-
199523• Because of that, in order to capture quantity uncertainty effects we use as an 
explanatory variable the variance of submitted prices (BlDVAR). We conjecture that BlDVAR 
would decrease with an increase in the information set available to bidders. Therefore, a 
positive sign is expected for the coefficient of BIDV AR. Nevertheless, it should be kept in 
mind that this variable will capture not only quantity uncertainty effects but also price 
uncertainty effects, so that we will not be able to analyze separately the effect of quantity 
uncertai nty. 
The sample we use includes auctions for 3, 5, 10 and IS-year bonds, and auction discounts 
may have different sizes across bonds. For that reason, we allow the constant coefficients to 
differ across bonds by using as regressors a dummy for each type of bond (DB3, DB5, DBJO 
and DBJ5). Besides, for further auction discount differences across bonds we use as an 
additional regressor the variable MATURiTY, measured as the period of time between auction 
settlement date and redemption date, which is expected to have a positive sign since a greater 
maturity is generally associated with higher volatility. 
For many of the auctions included in the sample, a bond with the same original maturity as 
the one being auctioned was to mature shortly. Since this fact could affect both the supply 
and the demand side of the auction. and therefore auction prices, the variable 
REDEMPTIONS is used as a regressor. REDEMPTIONS is the nominal amount maturing in 
the auction month in bonds with original maturity similar to that auctioned. This variable can 
have either a positive or a negative effect on auction discount: bigger redemptions may imply 
higher pressure on the Treasury to issue a bigger quantity. and then a positive sign on 
auction discount could be expected. But on the other hand, this variable gives some quantity 
information to bidders, and then a negative effect on auction discount could be expected. 
H Measured by the standard deviation of the last 20 daily price differentials. 
23 In fact, performing an equal means Wald test for January 1993-July 1 995 and for July 
1 995-August 1997 bond market volatility the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected. 
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FinaJly, to take into account differences between initial auctions and reopening auctions we 
used DNEW, which is a dummy variable with value I if the auction is an initial one and 0 
otherwise. According to the results presented in the previous section, a positive sign is 
expected for this variable. 
Summary statistics and the correlation matrix for explanatory variables are reported in table 
4.  It should be noted that the variable COVERC is jointly determined with the dependent 
variable, the auction discount. For that reason, we use the cover ratio observed in the 
adjacent auction of an other bond as an instrument for COVERC". Results of 2SLS 
regressions of the auction discount on the aforementioned explanatory variables are showed 
in column 1 of table 5. Results can be summarized as follows: 
I. Participation and competition, measured by number of bidders and cover ratio 
respectively, have a statistically significant effect with the expected sign, i.e. a 
positive sign for participation and a negative one for competition. It may be argued 
that these two variables should not be included in the same regression equation since 
an increase in the number of bidders implies an increase in competition. As 
discussed before, in multiple-unit auctions this may not hold, and an example is the 
Spanish case. In effect, table 4 shows that the variables BIDDERS and COVERC 
have a correlation coefficient of (-.17). Besides, dropping any of the two variables 
from the regression yields a coefficient for the variable included similar to the 
regression including both of them, and a statistically significant one. In other 
empirical work (Spindt and Saltz (92), Scalia (97). Berg(97)) a negative sign is also 
obtained for the cover ratio while results for number of bidders are mixed (positive 
in Umlauf (93) and Berg (97) and negative in Scalia (97)). 
2. Variables measuring price and quantity uncertainty (BIDBAR, VOLATILITY and 
MATURITy) have, as hypothesized, a positive effect. This result is compatible with 
the conjecture that quantity information affects the size of auction discount. 
Regressions displayed in columns 2 and 3 of table 5 show that using a dummy 
variable to measure the effect of an increase in quantity information (DANNOUNCE) 
may capture instead the effect of a decrease in market volatility. Thus, when 
replacing VOLATILITY by DANNOUNCE, the coefficients for BIDVAR and 
DANNOUNC£ are statistically significant. However, when replacing BIDVAR by 
DANNOUNCE, the coefficient for VOLATILITY is not statistically significant while 
24 More precisely: for auctions on 3-year, 5-year and 15·year bonds the instrument used is 
the cover ratio of the adjacent to-year bond auction; for the to·year bond auction the 
instrument used is the cover ratio of the adjacent 3-year bond auction. 
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that for DANNOUNCE is. 
3. The variable REDEMPTIONS seems to have no effect on the auction discount. Its 
coefficient has a negative sign but it is not statistically significant. Dropping this 
variable from the regression (see column 6 of table 5) yields very similar results in 
terms of R2 and of the coefficients of all other explanatory variables. 
4. The coefficient of the dummy variable used to separate initial auctions from 
reopening auctions (DNEW) has, as expected, a positive sign. but it is not 
statistically significant. A possible explanation for it is that the number of 
observations for initial auctions is very small compared to the observations for 
reopening auctions (7 and 155 respectively). Running a regression that includes only 
observations for reopening auctions yields very similar results (not displayed here) 
that those shown in column I of table 5.  
5 .  The adjusted R' i s  small, (.25), but similar or higher to that obtained i n  other 
empirical work, which ranges 0.12-.22. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores Spanish Treasury auctions. First, we present a model that considers both 
the hybrid system of uniform and discriminatory auctions used in Spain and the uncertainty 
about the volume to be issued. The main result is that for the Spanish auction format, there 
exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that maximizes the seller's revenue, which is  unique 
in the sense that each of the equilibria gives the same utility to all players. This result gives 
the idea that both the discriminatory and the Spanish auction format behave in a similar way 
in the. model proposed. The model we use is a stylized version of government bond auctions, 
and it abstracts from many features of the market. Note that auctions of multiple units are 
very complicated games, and that the Spanish auction format is even more complex, since 
the price winning bidders pay if their bid is above the weighted average of winning bids 
depends on all other winning bids; this fact makes the model very difficult to solve. 
Second, we present an empirical analysis, using data of Spanish bond auctions between 1 993 
and 1997, to test the predictions of the model and to establish the main characteristics of 
Spanish bond auctions. The main results of the empirical analysis are as follows: First, as 
predicted by the model, auction discounts are small in size and not statistically significant for 
auctions with volume announcements where the bond auctioned is identical to an existing one 
traded in the secondary market (reopening auctions) which we think that the model better 
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characterizes. Second, both participation and competition are significant determinants of the 
size of auction discounts: participation has a positive effect, since as the number of bidders 
increases the winner's curse is more severe, and they bid less aggressively. Competition, 
measured by the cover ratio, has a negative effect, as competition reduces the probability of 
winning and induces bidders to bid more aggressively. Third, variables measuring uncertainty 
faced by bidders seem also to have a positive effect on the size of auction discounts. 
Although in the analysis presented here it is not possible to separate the effect of price 
uncertainty from the effect of quantity uncertainty there is some indication that both sorts of 
uncertainty matter. 
We think that several policy implications can be drawn from the results presented here. First, 
Spanish auction format proves to be non-prejudicial to the Treasury, at least for reopening 
auctions, since auction discounts are, on average, close to zero and, in any case, generally 
no bigger than the observed bid-ask spread in the secondary market. Second, reopenings are 
a beneficial practice to the Treasury, since in these auctions price uncertainty faced by 
bidders is lower through the price discovery function of the secondary market, SO that 
average auction discounts are considerably smaller in size for reopenings than for initial 
auctions. Note that reopenings are not widely used, and some authors have e�pressed doubts 
about their desirability. And third, as predicted by single-unit auctions models, the Treasury's 
announcement of target amounts, even as a joint figure, seems also to be a beneficial practice 
to the Treasury, since there is some indication that auction discounts are smaller the better 
the participants are quantity informed. The obvious implication is that it would be even more 
beneficial to the Treasury to make more specific and committed volume announcements. 
We have still a lot of work to do. In the theoretical model, we want to relax the assumption 
that demands are known to the bidders, and see whether the results of the model hold in a 
game where incomplete information is not only because of supply uncertainty. Also, we want 
to allow more than one bid per bidder. In the empirical analysis, we have analyzed only 
average behaviour, but we plan to characterize individual bidder behaviour. 
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TABLE I 
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL WORK 
AUTHOR DATA AND DISCOUNT MEASURE DISCOUNT DISCOUNT 
SAMPLE SIZE SIZE (YIELDS) 
(PRICES) 
Cammack 3 months US Thills Quoted price at auction day - WAP 4 bp 
(1991) 1973-1984 sisnificanl 
disrimioato 
Spindl & Stolz 3 month. US Thills When-issued quoted price 30 1.3 hI' 
(1992) (1982-1988) minutes before auction -WAP significant 
discrimiDato 
Cherebuni el al. Italian BTPs Log (average traded price on 14 bp S.2 bp 
(1993) (1990-1991) aeution daylstopout price) significant 
wWorm 
Umlauf (1993) Imonth Mexican Average n:sale prkcfWAP 1.7 hI' 
Thills (1986-91) �ignificanl 
discrimioato[)' aod 
uniform 
Bikhchandani "I 1&3 months US Whcn-iS>'ucd price quoted at time of I bp 
all (1994) Thills (l99(}-9\) auction - W AP non-signific. 
di'iCrimiDalory 
Sil7\Qn (l994) US T-n<)Ics Average auction rate-when-issued 0.37 bp 
(1990.-91) rate U auction lilT\C significant 
discriminatory 
ButligJio� and ltali�n BTPs. Ccr. Average traded prkc on au�tion 7 bp 
Drudi, 1994 and eros day-stop out pri�c !)O test 
(1989-92) 
UBiform 
Malvey, US T-No�s WAP-Whcn-issucd rate at auction unifonn:..(J.22 bp, 
AAhihald and (1992-95) time non-signifi� . 
Aynn. [996 discrimiDatol)" and 
wtif'orm discrim: 0.69 hp, 
si nific . 
Nyborg and US Thills. !)Otes Average auction ratc- when-issuc·d unifonn:-.2 bp, 
Sundaresan and oonds ratc 30 minutes befon: auction nu �ignif. 
(1996) (l992-1993) 
discriminatory a.od discrim: 0.4 bp 
tmiform no si nifi�ant 
Druddi and Italian BTPs �nd Avcrage traded price just hefon: 4 bp 
Massa (1997) CCT. auction-stop out price non-signifc. 
tmiform 
Scalia (1997) Italian BTP� and Avcrage traded price hefon: 4_2 bp 
CCTs (1995-96) auction- stop out price non-.ignifc. 
wWorm 
Breedon and UK Gilts When-iuued Quoted pricc just 10.9 bp 
Gulley (1996) (\988-1996) befof<t aU�lion- W AP non-signifi. 
discrimiuaton" 
Hamao and Japall.:u Bonds Avcrage auction ralc-Seco'ndny 2.8 bp, no 
Jcgadcc!<h (1989-95) martet price day aficr auction signifieam 
(]997 di..;criminalo 
Berg (1997) Central Bank of Awrage luetinn rate-reference 5.7 hp 
Norway cenificales second�ry market rate day aftcr no tcst 
(l993-1995) aUclion 
discriminatory 
Note: bp'" basis points (I bp""O.OJ of 1 pereentage point) 
This table is taken from Scalia «(997) except for the last four references 
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TABLE 2.A 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS m' SPANISH TREASURY BOND AUCTIONS 
ALL 
AUCTIONS 
Number of auctions analyzed 
Competitive volume 1mbmiued 
Total volume issued 
Vol. of competitive bids accepted 
Num. bids (c) 
Num competitive bidders 
Num noo"<Ompetitve bids 
Num bidders with only competitive bids 
Num bids per bidder 
vol. bid per bid 
Vol. hid per bidder 
Cover ratio (bid vol/accepted vol) (e) 
$winning bids (e) 
$winners (c) 
%vol awarded al WAP (e) 
%bids paying WAP (e) 
,",winners al WAP(c) 
%vol paying stop-out price 
W AP-stop out price 
Max bid-stop out price 
Mu: bid pric�-Min bid pric� 
std. of bid prices 
std. of paid prices 
Target vol for 3 + lO-year bonds 
Target vol for 5 + 15-year bonds 
Volumes are in billions of peselas. 
Bids by non-mcmbefll arc aggregated by price. 
Non-competilive bids by non-members arc counted as 1 bid. 
te) refers to compc!titive bids 
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192 
mean 
254.0 
124.6 
122.9 
83.27 
30.86 
23.82 
16.65 
2.162 
4.245 
7.075 
3.099 
43.8 
6 1 .  7 
42.1 
61.5 
62.8 
46.6 
0.103 
3.499 
5.842 
0.795 
0.036 
279.7 
228.7 
INITIAL REOPENING 
AUCTIONS 
AUCTIONS 
29 163 
mean mean 
355.7 236.3 
194.2 1 12.5 
193.0 110.7 
121.3 76.62 
41.34 29.02 
21.34 24.25 
24.66 15.25 
2.541 2.096 
3.543 4.368 
7.087 7.073 
2.029 3.286 
5 1 . 8  42.4 
71.3 60.1 
38.1 42.7 
61.4 61.6 
61.01 63.2 
38.1 48.0 
0.163 0.092 
3.928 3.425 
5.944 5.824 
0.609 0.827 
0.058 0.032 
333.9 271.3 
280.4 220.6 
TABLE 2.B 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SPANISH TREASURY BOND AUCTIONS 
INITLAL AUCTIONS 
wiiliout(l) 
Number of auctions analvzOO 15 
m<an 
Competitive volume submitted 369.2 
Volume issued 218. 1 
Competitive volume accepted 216.7 
Num. bids (c) 138.1 
Num competitive bidders 49.47 
Num non-competitive bidders \9.4 
Num bidders w. anJy compo bids 3 1 .27 
Num bids per bidder 2.532 
Vol. bid per bid 3.243 
Vol. bid per bidder 6.302 
Cover ratio (c) 1.875 
%winning bids (c) 57.8 
%winners (c) 75.7 
%voJ awardet at WAP (c) 29.6 
%bids paying WAP (c) 67.0 
%winners at WAP(c) 66.1 
%vol paying SlOp out price 42.7 
W AP-slop out price 0.207 
Max bid-stop out price 4.103 
Max bid-Min bid 6.668 
std. of bid prices 0.655 
std. of paid prices 0.073 
Target vol for 3 + IO-year bonds 
Target vol for 5 + 15-year bonds 
Volumes are in billions of pesetas. 
Bids by non-members arc aggregated by price:. 
Non-compt!titivc bids by non·members arc countt:d as I bid. 
Ie) refcrs to compt!tiLivc bids. 
with!l) 
14 
m<an 
341.2 
168.7 
167.6 
103.4 
32.64 
23.43 
17.57 
2.55 
3.865 
7.928 
2.195 
45.3 
66.5 
45.4 
52.9 
53.4 
33.1 
0. 1 1 7  
3.739 
5.168 
0.56 
0.041 
333.9 
280.4 
REOPENING AUCTIONS 
without(l l  withU' 
73 90 
mean """n 
212.0 256.8 
1 12.1  1 1 2.8 
1 10.1 1 1 1 . 2  
80.89 73.01 
3 1 .03 27.33 
25.29 23.37 
17.25 13.57 
2.011 2. 167 
2.904 5.604 
4.974 8.847 
4.201 2.514 
47.4 38.3 
62.8 57.7 
34.7 48.0 
63.1 60.3 
64.2 62.3 
55.6 41.6 
0.093 0.09\ 
3.906 3.018 
6.037 5.644 
1 . 0 1 1  0.672 
0.032 0.033 
271.3 
220.6 
0) wilh and without refers to with volwne announcement and withoUl 1'Olwnt amWUIlCi'ment, rC5pectively. 
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX FOR REGRESSORS 
.� ... roverc COyeradj ......, bidvar ...... ...... p • Moturit, 
'"'-
MEAN 9.56 3.33 3.48 30.52 1 .22 2.7 0.08 7.58 
STD 32.76 3.89 4.06 15.23 2.19 1 . 13 0.2 4.26 
N 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
AUCTION 
DISCOUNT 
COVERC -0.26 
COVERADJ .{l.23 0.72 
BlDERSC 0.31 .{l. 19 -0. 15 
BIDVAR 0.13 0.13 0.1 .{l.26 
VOLATILITY 0.12 0.19 0.24 .{l.02 0.25 
REDEMPTIONS -0.07 .{l.09 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.08 
MATURITY 0.06 .{l.04 .{l.08 .{l.25 0.07 -0.07 -0.29 
AUCTION DlSCOUNT= (Secondary market quoted price at t-\ - weighted averag.: of paid priceslxlOO. 
COVERC is volume bid over volume acct..-pted. COVERAOJ is the instrument used for COVERC. For observations 
of3, 5 and IS-year bond auctions, COVERADJ is the cover ratio of the lO-years bond auction taking place in the same 
day (or the day bdore). For observations of IO-year bond auctions, COVERADJ is the cover ratio of the 3-year bond 
auction laking place on the same day. BIDERSC is the number of compeLitive bidders. BIDVAR is the variance of bid 
submitted. VOLATILITY is secondary market volatility for 3-yearbond benchmark. MATURITY is the period oftimc, 
in y�n, between settlement auction date and redemption dalc of the bond being auctioned. For observations of 3 and 
S-year bond auctions, REDEMPTIONS is the volume ofoonds with an original ITUlturity of3 and S yean maturing in 
auction month. For observations of 1 0  and IS-year bond aUctionli, REDEMPTION is the volume of bonds with an 
original maturity of 10 years maturing in auction month. 
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TABLE S DETERMINANTS OF AUCTION DISCOUNTS 
DepeDdem variable: AUCTION DISCOUNT; Estimatioa pnxedllre: lSLS; NlDDber of obserntioas=- 162 
I COL I I COL l I COL l I COlA I COL> 
DBJ -51.90\ -29.777 -27.709 -22.965 -52.8M) 
I-s/a/ -2.95 -/.89 -1.60 -2.68 -2.99 
DBS -72.241 -54.606 -54.390 -20.482 -72.530 
I-SIal -2.57 -2./3 -2.03 -2.53 -2.58 
0810 -132.335 -122.039 -124.03\ -22.685 -128.590 
'-SIal -2.34 -2.28 -2.10 -2.38 -2.28 
DB15 -174.375 -172.010 -\84.028 -12.55\ -168.5011 
I-sIal -2.08 -2.16 -2.33 -1.46 -2.0/ 
CaVERe -2.642 -3.251 -3.420 -2.540 -2.613 
I-SIal -3.15 -4.55 -4.96 -3.14 -3.34 
BIDERSC 0.596 0.442 0.274 0.757 0.613 
/-Slill 3.43 2.49 /.53 4.99 '.49 
SIDVAR 3.342 2.874 3.549 3.460 
I_sial 2.85 2.88 3.12 '.29 
VOLATILITY 4.042 1.505 4.102 3.824 
/-slat 2.03 0.76 2.00 /.96 
MATURITY 1 1 .642 13.656 14.135 1 1 .223 
I-stal 1.97 2.38 2.6/ 1.9() 
REDEMPTION -15.793 -5.818 -8.035 -13.817 
I-Sial -J.Z2 -0.47 -0.62 -/./0 
DNEW 5.847 -4.213 -3.268 6.7n 6.269 
I-Sial 0.66 .0.44 -O.J6 0. 78 0.71 
DANNOUNCE. -22.2.B -23.4JI 
I-stal -4.67 -4.74 
{adj)R' 0.252 0.J18 0.291 0.237 0.2.�4 
RMSE 29.370 28.060 28.604 29.680 29.346 
DW d-slal 1 .90 2.()6 2.09 1 .86 1.87 
Whilc', gcncral lc5t for reject Ho rej��t Ii. 
hctcTOs.:.:cdasticity 
reject Ho reject Ho reject· Ii. 
H. = homoscedasli�ily 
l-slal are heteroscedastic.ty CODSISIeDI. 
AUCTION DlSCOUNT= (Secondary market quoted price at t-l • weighted average of paid prices)xl OO. DB3,DBSiiDBIO,DBIS arc dummies for 3,  5, 10 and 15-yearbonds. rcspectivdy. COVERC IS volume bid over volume accepted. IDERSC is the number of competitive bidders. BIDVAR is Il e variance of bids submitted. VOl,ATIUTY 
is secondary market volatility for 3-year bond benchmark. MATURITY is the period of time, in years, between 
settlement auction date and redemption date of the bond being auctiont;<.L For observation$ of 3 and S-year bond auctions, 
REDEMPTIONS is the volume of bonds with an original maturity of 3 and 5 years maturing in auction month. For 
observations of 1 0  and IS-year bond auctions, REDEMPTION is tht: volumt: of bonds with an original maturity of 1 0  
years maturing in auction month. DNEW i s  a dummy for initial auctions with value I i f  the observation i s  o f  an initial 
auetion and 0 otherwise. DANNOUNCE is a dummy for volume announcement which takes value 0 up to July 1995 and 
I therea fter. 
For the variable COVERC the instrument COVERADJ was used. For ob$ervations of 3, 5 and I5-year bond auctions, 
COVERADJ is Ihe eover ratio of Ihe I O-year bond auetion taking place on the same day (or tht: day before). For 
observations of 10-years bond auclions. COVERADJ is thl: cover rallo of the 3-ycars bond l1uction taking place in the 
same day. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Proof of Corollary 1 
First, note that x "' [x/(x +y))Y � D,(p'), and y "' [y/(x +y))Y � D,(p·). 
Assume that player 2 submits a bid (p', y). Player I can: 
i) Bid (p< p', x). He receives at most Y-y ,,; Y - D,(p') � D,(p·). Any x greater 
or equal to Y-y maxi mazes his payoff function. Therefore x = DI(p"') maximizes his 
payoff function. 
ii) Bid (p = p "', x). He pays p "', and therefore it is optimal to bid x such that 
D,(p') � [x/(x +y)]Y. 
iii) Bid (p > p*, x). Since he pays the weighted average price. that is lower than p 
and higher than p., receives x with probability I, and demand is decreasing. it 
follows that x < D,(p·). 
But bids i) and iii) are dominated by bid ii): 
- Bid i), (p< p', D,(p'» is dominated by bid ii). This result follows from the 
assumption of the proposition. 
- Bid iii), (p > p', x < D,(p'», is dominated by bid ii), since player I pays a 
lower price, p*. and receives DI(p"') with probability 1. 
- 38 -
APPENDIX 1 
. .
 
-
-
�
 
--
-
�
 
--
-
--
-
--
-
--
-
--
.
. 
. 
TA
BL
E 
A.
I. 
SU
MM
AR
Y 
!>'T
AT
IST
IC
S F
OR
 SO
ME
 A
lIC
Ti
ON
 RE
Sl
iL
TS
 
A
LL
 A
U
CT
IO
N
S 
INIT
lA
L 
A.
U
CT
IO
N
S 
RE
O
PE
N
IN
G
 A
U
CT
IO
N
S 
.,.
..,In
 
I 
�
, 
I 
m
in
 
I me
di
an
 I 
.,
 
m
ea
n 
I 
�
, 
I 
m
in
 
I me
di
an
 
I 
.,
 
me
an
 
I 
-
, 
I 
mi
, 
I m<d
lw
 I 
.,
 
£t
�
��
vc
 vo
l 
25
4 
86
7.3
 
15
.3
6 
24
2.5
 
17
4.
4 
JS
S.
7 
65
8.3
 
II
S.
S 
31
:'i.
2 
14
8 .
 .'1 
23
6.
3 
86
7.3
 
15
.3
6 
22
4.3
 
17
2.
9 
V
ol
um
e 
is
su
ed
 
12
4.
6 
51
6.
9 
2.
28
 
12
1.4
 
97
.8
3 
19
4.
2 
35
9.
9 
43
.58
 
19
0 
84
.9.'1
 
11
2 .
 .'1 
51
6.
9 
2.
28
 
10
4 
95
.02
 
fe
��
ft!
�t
iv
c 
vo
l 
12
2.
9 
51
6.
6 
1.
11
2 
119
.1
 
97
.86
 
19
3 
35
7.6
 
43
.32
 
\8
8.
7 
!4
.7
S 
11
0.
7 
51
6.
6 
1.
11
2 
10
2.7
 
95
.0
2 
N
um
. b
id
, 
(e
) 
83
.27
 
42
0 
II
 
77
 
50
.45
 
l2
1.J
 
23
1 
63
 
11
2 
39
.8
1 
76
.6
2 
42
0 
II
 
70
 
49
.2
5 
�
�:r
c;:'
Om
p e
lil
i v
c 
30
.86
 
84
 
6 
29
 
14
.58
 
41
.3
4 
72
 
21
 
J6
 
13
.6
1 
29
.0
2 
84
 
, 
27
 
13
.9
9 
N
UI
lI 
TIQ
{I-
23
.8
2 
�o
m
pd
lll
vc
 b
id
de
n
 
48
 
3 
25
 
lO
.n
 
21
.J
4 
J4
 
6 
2J
 
8.7
39
 
24
.2
5 
..
 
3 
25
 
10
 . . H
 
���
 � b
id
de
rs
 
16
.6
5 
63
 
I 
14
 
10
.8
2 
24
.66
 
"
 
II
 
20
 
11
.95
 
U
.2
5 
63
 
I 
13
 
10
.0
1 
�o
m
pc
ll\rv
C 
bi
ds
 
�
�t
�i
dl
 p
er
 
2.
16
2 
4.
79
8 
1.2
31
 
2.
11
2 
0.
46
1 
2.
54
1 
3.3
43
 
1.9
4 
2.4
52
 
0.
35
9 
2.0
96
 
4.7
98
 
i.2
JI
 
2.0
72
 
0.
44
5 
V
ol
. b
id
 p
er
 b
id
 
4.
24
5 
J2
.17
 
0.
'
" 
J.
OI
I 
4.
72
2 
J.S
4J
 
9.3
73
 
!.I
54
 
3.3
27
 
1.7
44
 
4.
36
8 
J2
.17
 
0.
03
6 
2.
92
4 
'.06
 
V
ol
. b
id
 p
er
 b
id
de
r 
7.0
75
 
69
.05
 
0.
15
9 
5.7
02
 
7.
H
2 
7.
08
7 
16
.19
 
2.
24
8 
6.
506
 
J.00
3 
7.0
73
 
69
.05
 
0.
1S
9 
5.
14
1 
8.
06
2 
C
ov
er
 tI
Itio
 
3.
09
9 
29
.16
 
1.0
41
 
2.
18
 
J.
59
 
2.
02
9 
5.7
43
 
1.0
41
 
1.8
47
 
0.
96
S 
3.2
86
 
29
.16
 
1.0
73
 
2.2
38
 
3.8
42
 
� 
"
w
in
ni
ng
 b
id
, (
�) 
43
.8
 
90
.' 
2 ..
 
...
..
 
IY
.&
 
51
.&
 
90
.' 
14
.5
 
53
.5 
20
.1 
42
.4
 
90
.2
 
2.4
 
4J
.3
 
19
.4
 
I 
"
w
inn.:
rs
 (
e)
 
61
.7
 
96
.3
 
'.3
 
66
.7
 
21
.2
 
71
.3
 
96
.3 
22
.7
 
72
.7
 
20
.1 
60
.1 
96
.2
 
'.
3 
64
 
21
 
���
 ,�"
rdcd
 II 
42
.0
 
84
.8
 
0.
0 
39
.1 
37
.J 
3&
.2
 
67
.2
 
6.
' 
J5
.9
 
10
.3 
42
.7
 
84
.&
 
0.
0 
40
.0
 
38
.2
 
�bi
d'
 p
ay
in
g 
W
A
P 
61
.6
 
94
.6
 
7.
7 
50
 
61
.6
 
61
.-4
 
84
.7
 
24
.1 
56
.7
 
5J
.0
 
61
.6
 
94
.6
 
7.
7 
53
.3 
63
.7
 
" ,�
n.1 
62
.9
 
93
.5
 
11
.1 
56
.3 
"'1
.1
 
61
.0
 
81
.2
 
33
.3
 
56
.3
 
"
.0
 
63
.2
 
93
.5
 
11
.1
 
56
.7
 
62
.5 
"
vo
l p
.y
in
J: 
slo
p 
"
.6
 
10
0 
• .
> 
43
.5 
::
.1 
38
.1 
93
.7
 
'.
7 
J4
 
20
.2
 
..
 
100
 
9j
 
..
.> 
22
.2 
0 1,1
1 p
ne
e 
W
A
P·
�t
op
 Q
UI
 pr
i.:
c 
0.
10
3 
0.8
75
 
0 
0.
08
1 
0.
10
4 
0.
16
3 
0.
87
5 
0 
0.
12
5 
0.
18
2 
0.0
92
 
0.'
 
0 
0.
07
4 
0.0
8 
M
�x
 b
id
 p
·s
lo
p 
QU
I 
pn
ec
 
3.4
99
 
29
.5 
0 
2.
1 
·1.
31
1 
3.
92
8 
16
.3
 
0.
37
5 
2.J
75
 
3.
7S
I 
3.4
25
 
29
.5 
0 
1.9
38
 
4.4
07
 
�IX
 bid 
pr
ic
e-
M
in
 
5.8
42
 
J2
 
0.
45
 
4.
35
 
S.
19
8 
5.9
44
 
17
.2
5 
U
 
4.
' 
4.4
27
 
5.8
24
 
J2
 
0.
45
 
4.
2.
.'i 
5.3
33
 
" 
p 
Sid
. o
f 
bi
d 
pr
ic
n
 
0.7
95
 
3.
61
7 
0.
10
2 
0.
50
9 
0.6
89
 
0.
60
9 
1.5
53
 
0.
19
4 
0.
45
 
0.
39
6 
0.
82
7 
3.
61
7 
0.
10
2 
0.
52
8 
0.7
24
 
li
d.
 o
fp
li
d 
pr
ie
n
 
0.
03
6 
0.2
62
 
0 
0.Q
28
 
O.
OJ
� 
0.
05
8 
0.
26
2 
0 
0.0
45
 
0.0
55
 
0.
03
2 
0.2
 
0 
0.
02
3 
0.
02
9 
I�
fa' 
yv
g�
�
, 
27
9.
7 
'"
 
1>
0 
27
5 
89
.19
 
33
3.
9 
'"
 
1>
0 
J1
2.
5 
112
.9
 
27
1.3
 
'0
0 
1>
0 
'"
 
82
.S
J 
I 
It1
�1 y�'!
1J
1:"o
n'h
 
22
8.
7 
40
0 
'"
 
m
 
13
.53
 
28
0.
4 
'"
 
1>
0 
26
2.
5 
76
.07
 
22
0.
6 
40
0 
12
' 
m
 
70
.18
 
I 
V
ol
um
n
 Ire 
in
 b
ill
io
ns
 o
r p
cS
<!t
as
. 
I ..
 
TA
BL
E 
A
.1
. SUM
MARY 
ST
AT
IS
TI
CS
 F
OR
 SO
M
E 
AU
CT
lO
'" 
RE
SU
LT
S 
AL
L 
AU
cn
ON
S 
mel
n I
 �
. I
 mi
n 
I m
ed
ia
n 
I 
Canpd
ill
v�
 v
ol
 IUbmit
tc:d 
2"
 
86
7.3
 
Vo
IlI
InC
 is
Sl
l<d 
12
4.
6 
51
6.
9 
Com"
C'li
tin
 vo
ll
CCq>
ted
 
12
2.
9 
51
6.
6 
Num
. b
Hb
 (e
) 
83
.2
7 
42
0 
Num
 com.
pC'lil
iv� 
bid<k
 .. 
30
.86
 
"
 
Num
 ..
......:ompc
litiv
� b
idd
ers
 
23
.32
 
..
 
Nwn
 of
 bid
de ..
 w
ith
 o
nl
y 
c"",
,,
,,!il
iv
� 
bi
d.
 
16
.6
5 
6J
 
Nwn
 bi
d.
 pu
 bi
dd
er 
2.
16
2 
4.7
911
 
Vo
l. 
bi
d p
cr
 bi
d 
4.2
45
 
32
.17
 
Vo
l. 
bid
 I"'
r 
bi
dd
 ..
 
7.0
75
 
69
.05
 
Cov
or
rati
o 
3.0
99
 
29
.16
 
�w
;�
 bidJ
 (e
) 
43
.8
 
90
.9 
"w
ilW
n(
c) 
61
.7
 
96
.3 
\liv
ol
aw
ar<kil
 II.
 W
A
P 
te
) 
42
.0
 
114
.8 
'b
ic
h,
..r
u.
 W
A
P
tc
) 
61
.6
 
94
.6 
.
w
u.
...rs
 I
I W
A
"
.)
 
62
.9
 
93
.5
 
';v
el 
pay
u.
 .t
op
 00l
 pr
ie�
 
..
..
 
100
 
W
AP
·*'P
 Old
 pr
ic
e 
0.
10
3 
0.
87
5 
Max
 bi
d 
...
..
 "'"
 out
 pr
ic
e 
3.4
99
 
29
.5 
Max
 bi
d p
ric
e·
M
in
 bi
d p
 
5.11
42
 
J2
 
.I
d.
 of
 bid
 pri
en
 
0.
79
5 
3.
61
7 
'loJ
. of
 sm
d 
pr
ic
e.
 
0.0
36
 
0.2
62
 
T.r,d
 v
ol
 for
 l+
lO
y 
bo
ods 
27
9.7
 
'"
 
T
 ....
 d 
vo
l f
or
 j
 + 
IS
 ye
an
 b
on
d.
 
22
3.
7 
40
0 
V,
,)U
rll
es
 a
�
 in
 b
ill
ion
s o
f p
es
eta
s. 
Bi
d,
 b
y 
no
n·
m
em
be
r,
 an:
: 8
j:g
re
ga
te
d 
by
 p
rit
e. 
No
n-.
.:om
pd
iliv
e b
id
s b
y 
nu
n·
me
mb
en;
 a
re
 co
un
led
 I
S 
1 b
id
. 
(�)
 �
fe
rs 
10
 co
m
J><!
lit
ive
 b
ids
 
15
.J
6 
24
2.'s
 
2.2
3 
12
1.4
 
1.
11
2 
11
9.
7 
II
 
n
 
• 
29
 
3 
"
 
I 
14
 
1.2
31
 
2.
1l
2 
0.0
86
 
3.
0l
l 
0.
15
9 
5.7
02
 
1.0
41
 
2.
13
 
2.
' 
44
.4
 
5.3
 
66
.7
 
0.
0 
39
.1 
7.
7 
54
.5 
11
.1
 
56
.3
 
9.
' 
43
.5
 
0 
0.
08
1 
0 
2.
1 
0.4
5 
4.
3S
 
0.
10
2 
0.
50
9 
0 
0.
02
8 
IS
O 
m
 
'"
 
22
l 
IN
IT
IAL
 A
UC
TI
ON
S 
""
 
�'
"I
�·
I
 min
 
I me
di
ln
 I 
0'
 
17
4.
4 
J's
5.7
 
65
3.
3 
11
5.
8 
37
5.2
 
14
1.
5 
97
.83
 
19
4.
2 
J5
9.
9 
43
.58
 
19
0 
84
.9
5 
97
.8
6 
19
3 
35
7.
6 
43
.3
2 
18
8.
7 
34
.7
5 
50
.45
 
12
U
 
23
1 
6J
 
11
2 
39
.8
1 
14
.58
 
4U
4 
72
 
21
 
36
 
1l
.6
1 
10
.3
2 
2U
4 
J4
 
• 
2J
 
8.7
39
 
10
.8
2 
24
.66
 
"
 
II
 
20
 
I J
.9
S 
0.
46
1 
2.
54
1 
3.3
411
 
1.9
4 
2.
45
2 
0.
35
9 
4.
72
2 
3.5
43
 
9.3
73
 
1.1
54
 
3.
32
7 
1.7
44
 
7.5
22
 
7.
011
7 
16
.19
 
2.2
43
 
6.5
06
 
3.
(10
3 
3.
59
 
2.0
29
 
5.7
43
 
1.0
41
 
1.8
47
 
0.
96
5 
19
.11
 
51
.8
 
90
.9 
14
.5
 
5U
 
20
.1 
21
.2
 
71
.3
 
96
.3 
22
.1
 
72
.7
 
20
.1 
37
.3
 
38
.2
 
67
.2
 
'.
4 
35
.9
 
30
.3
 
62
.6
 
61
.4
 
84
.7 
24
.1 
"
.7
 
53
.0
 
61
.1
 
61
.0
 
81
.2
 
33
.3
 
56
.3
 
48
.0
 
22
.1 
311
.1 
93
.7
 
9.
7 
J4
 
20
.2
 
0.
10
4 
0.
16
3 
0.
87
5 
0 
0.
12
5 
0.
18
2 
4.
31
1 
J.9
28
 
16
.3 
0.
37
5 
2.
l7
5 
3.
75
1 
5.
19
8 
5.9
44
 
17
.2
5 
I.l
 
4.
' 
4.
42
7 
0.
68
9 
0.6
09
 
1.5
5)
 
0.
19
4 
0.4
5 
0.
39
6 
0.
03
5 
0.0
58
 
0.
26
2 
0 
0.0
45
 
0.0
55
 
89
.19
 
33
J.9
 
'"
 
IS
O 
31
2.
5 
11
2.
9 
73
.53
 
211
0.4
 
l7
l 
IS
O 
26
2.5
 
76
.0
7 
_
. _
_ .
. _
_
 .. _
_
 ..
 -
RE
O
PENlN
O
 A
UC
TI
ON
S 
m
el
n 
I 
mu·
l
 mi
n 
J me
dia
n 
I 
""
 
23
6.
J 
86
7.
3 
15
.3
6 
22
4.3
 
17
2.
9 
11
2.
5 
51
6.
9 
2.
28
 
10
4 
95
.0
2 
11
0.
7 
's1
6.
6 
1.
11
2 
10
2.
7 
95
.0
2 
76
.6
2 
42
0 
II
 
70
 
49
.25
 
29
.0
2 
84
 
• 
27
 
1l
.9
9 
24
.25
 
48
 
3 
"
 
10
.5
3 
15
.2
5 
6J
 
I 
Il
 
10
.0
1 
2.0
96
 
4.
79
11 
1.2
31
 
2.0
72
 
0.
44
5 
4.
36
11 
32
.17
 
0.0
86
 
2.9
24
 
'.0
6 
7.
07
3 
69
.0
5 
0.
15
9 
5.
14
1 
8.0
62
 
3.
28
6 
29
.16
 
1.0
73
 
2.2
38
 
3.8
42
 
42
.4
 
90
.2 
2.
' 
43
.1
 
19
.4
 
60
.1 
96
.2
 
'J
 
..
 
21
 
42
.7
 
114
.8 
0.
0 
40
.0
 
38
.2
 
61
.6
 
94
.6
 
7.
7 
53
.3 
6J
.7
 
63
.2
 
93
.5
 
11
.1
 
56
.7
 
62
.5 
48
 
100
 
9.
' 
46
.' 
22
.2 
0.
09
2 
0.
' 
0 
0.
07
4 
0.
08
 
3.4
25
 
29
.5
 
0 
1.9
38
 
4.
40
7 
5.8
24
 
J2
 
0.
45
 
4.
25
 
S.
B
) 
0.
82
7 
3.
61
7 
0.
10
2 
0.
52
8 
0.
72
4 
0.
03
2 
0.
2 
0 
0.
02
3 
0.
02
9 
27
U
 
'0
0 
IS
O 
m
 
32
.5
) 
22
0.6
 
40
0 
'"
 
22
l 
70
.18
 
I t; I 
TA
BL
E 
Al
 (C
ONT)
 
REO
PE
N
IN
G
 A
UC
TI
ON
S 
W
TTH
Ov
r 
VO
LU
M
E 
-
I
 m u
 
1 
C
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
vo
lu
m
e 
su
bm
in
ed
 
21
2 
86
7.
3 
Vo
lum
e 
i.&
ue
d 
11
2.
1 
51
6.
9 
C
om
pe
tit
ive
 v
ol
um
e 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
11
0
.1
 
51
6.
6 
N
um
. b
id
li 
(c
) 
80
.8
9 
.,.
 
Nu
m
 co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
bi
dd
us
 
3
1.O
J 
84
 
Nu
m 
of
 no
n-<;
omp
eli
tiv
e 
bid
de
rs 
25
.2
9 
..
 
Nu
m
. o
f b
id
de
n
 w
ith
 o
nl
y 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
bi
ds
 
17
.2
5 
OJ
 
Nu
m
 bi
d.
 p.:
r b
idd
er
 
2.
0
11
 
Vo
l. b
id
 pe
r b
id
de
r 
2.
90
4 
N
um
 b
ids
 ..
.. r b
id
de
r 
4.
97
4 
Co
ve
r r
ati
o 
4.
20
1 
�
w
in
ni
rlj:
 b
id
s (
,) 
47
.4
 
%
w
inn
cr
s 
(c
) 
62
.8
 
%v
ol
 aw
ar
de
d 
at 
W
AP
 (c
) 
34
.7
 
%
bi
ds
 pa
yil
ll!
 W
AP
 (c
) 
63
.1
 
"w
iM
�n
 a
l W
AP
(�)
 
64
.2
 
%
vo
l p
ay
in
, 
&t
op
 OI
It p
ri
ce
 
55
.6
 
W
AP
·Sl
op
 o
ut
 p
ri,
e 
0.
09
3 
M
IX
 b
id
 p
·st
op
 o
ut
 p
 
3.
90
6 
M
ax
 b
id
 p
-M
in
 bi
d 
I' 
6.
03
7 
st
d.
 o
f b
id
 p
ri
ce
li 
1.
0
11
 
std
. o
f p
ai
d 
pr
ice
s 
0.
03
2 
T
ar
ie
! "
01
 fo
r J
 +
 10
 ).
 b
on
ds
 
Ta
ri
et 
vo
l 
fo
r 
5 
+ 
15
 y
u
n
 bo
nd
s 
Vo
lum
es
 a
re
 i
n 
bil
lio
N
 o
f p
e�
\l
Ii.
 
B
id
s 
by
 no
o-mc
mbc;
n 
Ir
e 
I"
re
il
te
d 
by
 p
ric
e.
 
No
n.
..:o
m
pe
lit
ive
 b
ids
 b
y 
no
n·
me
mbc
n 
I
re
 co
un
te
d 
1
$
 I 
bi
d.
 
(,)
 re
fe
n 
to 
co
m
pe
ti
tiv
e 
bi
d.
 
4.
79
8 
20
.5
 
4
1 29
.16
 
81
.8
 
95
.2
 
67
.3
 
94
.6
 
93
.5
 
100
 
0.
' 
29
.5
 
J2
 
3.
61
7 
0.
2 
m
in
 
I me
dia
n 
I 
..
. 
15
.3
6 
14
1.
9
 
19
7.
5 
2.
28
 
59
.6
3 
12
2.
9 
1.
11
2
 
57
.0
4 
12
3.
4 
1
1 
65
.5
 
68
.5
 
• 
25
.'
 
19
.1
6 
3 
24
 
11
.9
3 
1 
12
 
13
.9
6 
1.
23
1 
1.8
72
 
0.
61
3 
0.
<J
86
 
2.
39
 
2.
83
7 
0
.1
59
 
3.
63
3 
5.
48
3 
1.0
73
 
2.
03
6 
5.
46
8 
'
.2
 
48
.4
 
19
.5
 
12
.�
 
68
.4
 
19
.7
 
0.
0
 
2')
.'
 
30
.5
 
7.
7 
�O
.O
 
70
.5
 
ILl
 
50
.0
 
68
.1
 
••
• 
52
.8
 
23
.2
 
0 
0 .
..
. 
0.
09
4 
0 
2.
73
8 
4.
50
8 
0.
65
 
4.
68
8 
4.
77
5 
0.
14
3 
0.
73
2 
0.
&0
7 
0 
0.
02
1 
0.
0J
5 
REO
PEN
IN
G
 A
UCT
IO
NS
 WIT
H
 V
OL
UM
E 
-,
. 1
 -
, 
1 
mi
n 
I med
ian
 I 
wi
 
25
6.
8 
56
5.
1 
42
.1
4 
25
0.
3 
14
6.
9 
11
2.
8
 
25
1.
5 
1S
.7
1 
12
3.
6 
63
.3
3 
11
1.
2 
24
9.
9 
15
.2
9 
12
1 
62
.5
7 
73
.0
1 
12
8 
26
 
7J
 
22
.6
5 
27
.3
3 
41
 
15
 
27
.5
 
6.
87
1 
23
.3
7 
J8
 
• 
26
 
9.
16
9 
lJ
.S
7 
28
 
7 
13
 
3.
89
8 
2.
16
7 
2.
75
9 
1.
79
7 
2.
15
3 
0.
2 
, .
..
. 
32
.1
7 
0.
61
8 
3.
64
5 
6.
10
8 
8.
84
7 
69
.0
5 
0.
99
5 
6.
78
7 
11.3
92
 
2.
51
4 
5.
83
8 
1.0
84
 
2.
32
8 
0.
91
9 
38
.3
 
90
.2
 
2.
' 
38
.8
 
18
.5
 
�7
.7
 
96
.2
 
'.
3 
59
.2
 
21
.9
 
"
.0
 
..
..
 
0.
0 
44
.2
 
40
.'
 
60
.3
 
82
.4
 
20
.0
 
55
.1
 
48
.2
 
62
.3
 
90
.0
 
20
.0
 
58
.3
 
53
.1
 
41
.6
 
10
0 
..
 , 
39
.5
 
19
.1
 
0.
09
1 
0.
38
9 
0 
0.
07
7 
0.
116
6 
3.
0
18
 
22
.7
 
0 
I.'
 
4.
30
3 
5.
64
4 
"
 
0.
45
 
3.'
 
5.
78
4 
0.
67
2 
3.
04
1 
0.
10
2 
0.
47
3 
0.
60
9 
0.
03
3 
0.
14
2 
0 
0.
02
7 
0.
02
4 
27
1.
J 
'0
0 
15
0 
m
 
82
.S
3 
22
0.
6 
40
0 
12
5 
m
 
70
.18
 
I t I 
TA
BL
E 
A
l 
(C
ONT)
 
lN
lTIAL
 A
U
C
T
IO
N
S 
W
IT
H
O
U
T 
V
O
LU
M
E
 
m
ea
n 
I 
C
om
pe
lil
iv
e 
vo
lu
m
e 
su
bm
in
ed
 
36
9.
2 
V
ol
um
e 
is
su
ed
 
21
8.
1 
C
omp
el
ili
ve
 v
ol
um
e 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
21
6.
7 
N
um
. b
id
s 
(c
) 
13
8.
1 
N
um
 co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
bi
dd
er
s 
49
.47
 
N
um
 o
f 
no
n-
co
m
pe
lil
iv
e 
bi
dd
er
s 
19
.4
 
N
um
. o
f b
id
de
rs
 w
ith
 o
nl
y 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
bi
ds
 
31
.27
 
N
um
 b
id
s 
pe
r 
bi
dd
er
 
2.5
32
 
V
ol
 b
id
 p
er
 b
id
 
3.2
43
 
V
ol
 b
id
 p
er
 b
id
de
r 
6.
30
2 
C
ov
er
 I"I
lio
 
1.8
75
 
%
w
irm
in
g 
bi
ds
 (�
) 
57
.8 
%
w
in
ne
rs
 (c
) 
75
.7 
%
vo
la
w
ar
de
d 
al
 W
A
P 
(c
) 
29
.6 
%
bi
ds
 p
ay
in
g 
W
A
P 
(c
) 
67
.0
 
%
w
in
ne
rs
at
 W
A
P
(c
) 
66
.1 
%"'
01 
pa
yi
ng
 s
to
p 
ou
t p
ric
e 
42
.7 
W
AP
·s
to
p 
00
1 p
ric
e 
0.2
07
 
M
ax
 b
id
 p
'S
IO
po
ut
 p
 
4.
10
3 
M
ax
 h
id
 p
ric
�-
M
in
 h
id
 p
 
6.6
68
 
Si
d.
 o
f b
id
 p
ri,
es
 
0.6
55
 
st
d.
 o
f p
ai
d 
pr
ic
es
 
0.0
73
 
T
ar
ge
t v
ol
 f
or
 3
 + 
10
 Y
 bo
nd
s 
T
ar
ge
t v
ol
 f
or
 5
+
 15
 yu
rs
 b
on
ds
 
V
ol
uO\C
s 
I�
 i
n 
bi
lli
on
s 
of
 p
es
el
as
. 
B
id
s 
by
 no
n·
m
em
be
rs
 n
e 
Ig
gr
ug
al
ed
 b
y 
pr
ic
e.
 
N
on
-.;
om
pc
lil
iv
e 
bi
ds
 b
y 
RO
n·
m
em
be
rs
 a
�
 c
ou
nt
ed
 I
S 
I b
id
. 
(c
) �
fe
rs
 to
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
bi
ds
 
=,
 I
 
65
8.3
 
35
9.
9 
35
7.
6 
23
1 
72
 
34
 
"
 
3.3
48
 
6.
76
6 
13
.2
4 
5.7
43
 
90
.9 
96
.3 
60
.2 
84
.7 
81
.2
 
93
.7 
0.8
75
 
11
.5
 
17
.25
 
1.5
53
 
0.
26
2 
m
in
 
I m
ed
il
n 
I 
,,'
 
15
5.
1 
37
5.
2 
16
7.
1 
83
.34
 
20
9.4
 
94
.62
 
8l
.S
7 
20
8 
94
.54
 
OJ
 
14
4 
44
.66
 
2J
 
"
 
13
.99
 
6 
18
 
8.9
59
 
II
 
31
 
13
.4
9 
1.9
4 
2.S
 
0.4
02
 
1.1
54
 
3.
18
4 
1.6
34
 
2.2
48
 
5.
73
1 
2.8
85
 
1.0
41
 
l.S
61
 
Ll
55
 
15
.7
 
56
.3 
22
 
30
.3 
78
.3 
18
.9
 
6.
4 
22
.2 
26
.3 
24
.1 
67
.1 
57
.0
 
38
.9 
63
.6 
51
.6
 
9.
7 
39
.8 
24
.8
 
° 
0.
12
5 
0.2
42
 
0.3
75
 
3.
12
5 
3.3
56
 
I.S
 
5.
12
5 
4.
72
1 
0.
21
9 
0.4
5 
0.
43
1 
° 
0.
05
2 
0.0
72
 
IN
IT
lA
L 
A
U
C
TI
O
N
S 
W
IT
H
 V
O
L
U
M
E
 
m
nn
 
I 
m
ax
 
I 
m
in
 
I m
ed
ia
n 
I 
,�
 
34
1.2
 
53
5.9
 
11
5.
8 
34
2 
13
0.4
 
16
8.7
 
29
9.4
 
43
.58
 
18
4.
7 
67
.39
 
16
7.6
 
29
8.4
 
43
.32
 
18
3 
67
.0
9 
10
M
 
14
4 
69
 
98
.5 
24
.39
 
32
.64
 
41
 
22
 
33
 
5.
51
4 
23
.43
 
33
 
6 
24
 
8.3
09
 
17
.5
7 
22
 
13
 
17
 
2.6
81
 
2.5
5 
3.
17
5 
2.0
66
 
2.4
3 
0.3
22
 
3.8
65
 
9.3
73
 
1.8
05
 
3.3
56
 
1.8
61
 
7.9
28
 
16
.19
 
3.
61
 
7.7
57
 
2.9
97
 
2.
19
5 
4.0
35
 
1.3
29
 
2.0
48
 
0.
71
5 
45
.3 
66
 
14
.5
 
51
.1 
16
.1 
66
.' 
90
.9
 
22
.7 
71
.6
 
2J
 
45
.4
 
67
.2 
32
.1 
43
.1 
29
.5 
52
.9 
70
.0 
26
.3 
50
.2 
38
.2
 
53
.4
 
71
.4
 
3D
 
51
.7
 
33
.4
 
33
.1 
55
.5 
13
.8
 
33
.5 
13
.1 
0.
11
7 
0.
21
1 
0.
03
1 
0.
10
5 
0.0
58
 
3.7
39
 
16
.3 
0.
' 
2.2
25
 
4.
25
4 
5.
16
8 
17
.1 
U
S 
4.4
75
 
4.
11
7 
0.5
6 
1.4
88
 
0.
19
4 
0.
45
1 
0.
36
4 
0.0
41
 
0.0
69
 
0.
01
1 
0.0
4 
0.
01
9 
33
3.9
 
S2
S 
15
O 
31
2.
5 
11
2.
9 
28
0.4
 
37
S 
15
O 
26
2.5
 
76
.07
 

References 
Asubel, L. and P. Cramton, "Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions", 
University of Maryland Working Paper. 
Back, K.,  and J. Zender, 1993, "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the 
Treasury Experiment" .  Review 0/ Financial Studies, 6, 733-764. 
Bartolini, L., and C. Cottarelli. 1994. "Treasury Bill Auctions: Issues and Uses", Working 
Paper, IMF. 
Berg, S.A., 1996, "Central Bank auctions of deposit certificates', Arbeidsnotat, Norges Bank, 
1 996/0002. 
Breedom F. and J. Ganley, 1996, "Bidding and information: evidence from gilt-edged 
auctions', Working Paper, Bank of England, 42. 
Cammack, E., 199 1 ,  "Evidence of bidding strategies and the information in Treasury bill 
auctions", Journal 0/ Political Economy 99. 100-130. 
Gordy, M., 1996, "'Multiple Bids in a Multiple-Unit Common-Value Auction", Working 
Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Hamao, Y. and N. Jegasdeesh, 1997, "An analysis of bidding in the Japanese government 
bond auctions", forthcoming in Journal of Finance. 
Martinez Mendez. P., 1996, "The Spanish Market for Government Securities", manuscript. 
Maskin, E. and J. Riley, 1989, "Optimal multi-unit auctions", in The el:onomics o/missing 
markets, injomuJtion and games, edited by F. Hahn. 
Menezes, F . . 1995, "On the Optimality of Treasury Bill Auctions". Economic Letters, 49. 
273-279. 
Milgrom, P., and R. Weber, 1982, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding", 
£Conomelriea, SO, 1089-1 122. 
Pellicer, M., 1992, "Los mercados financieros organizados en Espana" , Estudios Econ6micos 
del Banco de Espana, SO. 
- 45 -
Ranjan Das, S., and R. Sundaram, 1 997, "Auction Theory: A Summary with Applications 
to Treasury Markets", Working Paper 5873, NBER. 
Salinas, R..  1990, "'Subastas de tHulas de deuda pUblica: un anaIisis de mecanismos de 
asignaci6n de recursos". Documento de Trabajo nO 9002, CEMFI. 
Scalia, A., 1 997, "Bidders profitability under uniform price auctions and systematic 
reopenings: the case of Italian Treasury bonds", Temi de Discu5sione, Banca d'Italia 303. 
Spindt P. and R. Stolz, 1 992, "Are U.S. Treasury bills underpriced in the primary market?", 
Journal of Banking and Finance 16, 891-908. 
Umlauf, S., 1993, "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction"'. Journal of 
Financial &onomics 33, 31 3-340. 
Wang, J . ,  and J. Zender, 1997, "Auctioning Divisible Goods", Working Paper, Fuqua 
School of Business, Duke University. 
- 46 -
WORKING PAPERS (1) 
9815 Roberto Blanco: Transmisi6n de informaci6n y volatiHdad entre el mercado de futuros so· 
bre el indice Ibex: 35 y el mercado al contado. 
9816 Mo- Cruz Manzano and Isabel Sanchez: Indicators of short-term interest rate expectations. 
The information contained in the options market. (The Spanish original of this publication 
has the same number.) 
9817 Alberto Cabrero, Jose Luis ESCril'3, Emilio Munoz and Juan Penalosa: The controllability 
of a monetary aggregate in EMU. 
98/8 Jose M. Gonzalez Minguez y Javier Santilllin Fraile: EI papel del euro en el Sistema Mo­
netario lnternacional. 
9819 Eva Ortega: The Spanish business cycle and its relationship to Europe. 
9820 Eva Ortega: Comparing Evaluation Methodologies for Stochastic Dynamic General Equi­
librium Models. 
9821 Eva Ortega: Assessing the fit of simulated multivariate dynamic models. 
9822 Coral Garcia y Esther Gordo: Funciones trimestrales de exportaci6n e importaci6n para la 
economfa espanola. 
9823 Enrique Aiberoia-lla and TImo Tyrviiinen: Is there scope for inflation differentials in 
EMU? An empirical evaluation of the Balassa-Samuelson model in EMU countries. 
9824 Concha Artola e Isabel Argimon: TItularidad y eficiencia relativa en las manufacturas es­
paiiolas. 
9825 Javier Andres, Ignacio Hernando and J. David LOpez-Salido: The long-run effect of per­
manent disinflations. 
9901 Jose Ramon Martinez Resano: lnstrumentos derivados de los tipos Overnight: call money 
swaps y futuros sobre fondos federales. 
9902 J. Andres, J. D. L6pez-Salido and J. Valles: The liquidity effecl in a small open economy 
model. 
9903 Olympia Bover and Ramon Gomez: Another look at unemployment duration: long-term 
unemployment and exit to a permanent job. (The Spanish original of this publication has 
the same number.) 
9904 Ignacio Hernando y Josep A. Tribo: Relaci6n entre contratos laborales y financieros: Un 
estudio te6rico para el caso espanol. 
9905 Cristina Mazon and Soledad Nunez: On the optimality of treasury bond auctions: the Spa­
nish case. 
(1) Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de Espana publications catalogue. 
Queries should be addressed to: Banco de Espana 
Secci6n de PubJicaciones. Negociado de Distribuci6n y Gesti6n 
Telephone: 91 338 5180 
Alcala. 50. 28014 Madrid 

